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I. Cur Deus Homo?  Configuring the Problem:
Cur Deus Homo? Anselm asked and answered, laboring to shoulder an
onerous burden of proof imposed by the metaphysical-value theory he and
his opponents shared.  Surely the “size-gap” between God and creatures
makes Incarnation indecent!  How could the Supreme Wisdom of a being a
greater than which cannot be conceived, consent to lower its position on
the ontological scale?1 To rebut this presumption against Incarnation,
Anselm looked for a reason that would make Incarnation conditionally nec-
essary, given Divine nature and purposes.  And he thought he found it, in
the conditional necessity of a Divine remedy for human sin.
Except for dedicated Abelardians, school theologians generally agreed
with Anselm’s conclusion that by His Incarnation and passion, Christ
makes satisfaction for human sin.  But by the middle third of the thirteenth
century, theological consensus had backed away from Anselm’s configura-
tion of the problem, because theologians began to read the implications of
Divine Power and Goodness in somewhat different ways.  On the one
hand, Omnipotence would surely be able to free Adam’s race from sin
without Christ’s Incarnation or passion.  Nor—pace Anselm—would
Justice require God (any more than human kings) to demand satisfaction
for an offense against the Godself.  It follows, twice-over, that remedy for
sin does not generate the conditional necessity that Anselm sought.  On the
other hand, the recovery of pseudo-Dionysius (whom Anselm never read)
introduced the idea that Goodness is by nature self-diffusing, that
Goodness has/is a positive tendency to share Itself with others, that—as
Plato insists—Divine generosity in sharing goodness could not be curbed
by envy.2 Theological consensus judged these latter notions to remove any
presumption against Incarnation.  Nevertheless, because Christians normal-
ly understood the Divine disposition to self-diffusion ad extra to be non-
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necessitating, they saw it as generating fitting reasons cur Deus homo, but
not ones that would render it conditionally necessary on God’s nature and
purposes.3 Once again, human sin is a fact, and Scripture tells us that its
remedy was an actual reason for Christ’s Incarnation and passion.  All
agreed, human sin is a sine qua non of Christ’s passion.  Yet, because their
philosophical understanding of Divine Goodness brought them to recog-
nize a variety of other reasons cur Deus homo, they naturally began to
debate the further question:  whether—in the absence of human sin—God
might still have freely acted on other considerations of propriety, whether
God would have become Incarnate, even if humans had never sinned?4
I find this medieval debate intriguing and instructive, both in terms of
methodology—e.g., in relation to a key question for Christian philoso-
phers, both medieval and contemporary, of what roles Scripture and philo-
sophical speculation play in theological formulation—and in terms of
material content—i.e., the variety of reasons cur Deus homo, their relative
weights and priorities, and their systematic connections.  In what follows, I
shall take acquaintance with Anselm’s argument for granted, the better to
concentrate on answers given by lesser known and also by equally eminent
successors.  All of these medieval treatments share the free-will-defender’s
contention that sin is optional.  In closing I shall shed further light on the
logical structure of medieval answers by contrasting them with my own
(what philosophers would call) ‘theodicy’ and (theologians) ‘soteriology,’
where human need for redemption is—given an alternative estimate of
Divine purposes—taken to be inevitable.
II. Cur Deus Homo?  Perfection and Fulfillment!
The variety of reasons for Incarnation may be overviewed, classified, and
contrasted from many angles.  [1] Where Anselm seeks the conditional
necessity of the Incarnation in the repair of something that need not have
been damaged, middle-third-of-the-thirteenth-century theologians—
including Robert Grosseteste and Richard Fishacre6—weigh arguments
that look instead to a three-fold consideration: [a] to the perfection of the
universe, [b] to the completion of what is finite and so generable, corruptible
and changeable, and [c] to the requirements of human perfection at its cen-
ter, straddling the realms of material and spiritual being.  Towards the end
of the century, Duns Scotus begins with human perfection in particular,
with union with God—membership in the trinitarian circle of friendship
love—as the supranatural end of humankind.  [2] Alternatively, it could be
said that all of these thinkers agree that the condition of creation generally
and of human being in particular is non-optimal apart from Incarnation.
Anselm rivets attention on how sin pulls us down below nature’s norm,
whereas later thinkers note how Incarnation would complete the cosmos,
or raise human being above the naturally achievable.  [3] Again, Anselm
and later theologians all agree that—in one way and another—Incarnation
contributes to the second half of the metaphysical and spiritual exitus/reddi-
tus by which creatures “go out” from God in creation and “return to” God
in various kinds of union.
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2.1. Completing the Cosmos, Perfecting the Microcosm: Middle-third-
of-the-thirteenth century authors collected a whole battery of arguments—
Grosseteste lists nineteen—for the affirmative answer, that God would
have become Incarnate anyway, even if Adam had not sinned.  [1] One
group focusses on cosmic completion writ large.  [a] Self-diffusing Goodness,
envy-free Divine generosity would flood the created universe with as
much goodness as it is capable of receiving.  But the capacity of hypostatic
union is the noblest of created capacities, and its actualization would con-
fer on creation its highest dignity.  So far from being conferred at the fall,
this capacity and Divine inclination to actualize it would—if anything—be
diminished by sin.  Surely Divine Goodness and Power would not have
withheld this honor if instead rational creatures had always obeyed!7
[b] Again, the unity of the universe requires its organization under a single
head.  But this role could not be filled by a mere angel or mere human,
because they are on a metaphysical par and so are not appropriately subor-
dinated to one another but only to God.  Yet, God is not in a genus; so no
creature can share genus or species with the Divine.  Therefore, the unity of
the universe requires God to join Godself to it in hypostatic union.  Nor
would a God-angel do, because hypostatic union with a merely spiritual
creature would not unite the spiritual with the material.  By contrast,
human nature is a microcosm, which participates in both.  Human being
joins a rational soul and a human body in personal union, its soul sharing
intelligence with the angels, and its body sharing constitution from the
four elements with all other bodies.  Thus, the unity of the universe would
require God to become Incarnate in human nature, even apart from sin.8
[c] Likewise, the beauty of the universe is enhanced by Incarnation,
because it joins the beginning (the Divine Word as creative source) with
the end (human nature as last created) to form a circle, the most excellent
shape.  Indeed, creation is doubly circular, with another circumference
swinging around from Christ the creator out to Adam and back through
Adam the forefather of Jesus Christ (cf. the Lucan genealogy).9 Again,
hypostatic union enhances the glory of the universe, because it glorifies the
flesh of Christ (the way wood glows when united to fire) and makes flesh
worthy of adoration due to God.10
[2] Turning then to that microcosmic perfection in which cosmic perfection
finds its center, it would seem unfitting for the creation of the noblest crea-
ture—viz., the soul of Christ—or the actualization of human nature’s
noblest capacity—viz., that for hypostatic union with a Divine person—to
be only for the instrumental purpose of redeeming sinners.11 Likewise, it
would seem contrary to justice for human being to gain the highest dignity
of Incarnation as a consequence of its own malice towards God!12 Again,
would the bodily eye’s highest capacity—to see the glorified flesh of
God—be left unactualized, just because human beings had refrained from
sinning?13
[3] In any event, the Anselmian metaphysical “size-gap” between
Godhead and human being means that sin is not the only obstacle to be
overcome.  For it is just as impossible for sinless but finite souls to unite
with infinite goodness by their own power, as it is for any mere creature to
make satisfaction for sin.  [a] One argument combines the Pauline theme of
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justification with Anselm’s insistence that justice (or the affectio iustitiae) is a
special gift from God over and above nature, to contend that even sinless
humans and angels would need to be justified by God.  But if only the
Divinity of Christ were involved in conferring justice, then His humanity
would be assumed only to provide the material with which to suffer,
which—pace Anselm—seems absurd.14
Again, the Bible tells us that human being is destined to be joined to
God, not merely in a conformity of wills, but through a union of natures,
not just by spiritual harmony but by a union of flesh.15 [b] For surely our
sinlessness would not undermine Divine resolve to make us God’s children
by adoption.  But mere conformity of will does not make us God’s children
or Christ’s siblings but at most friends or obedient servants.  We can share
in Christ’s Sonship only if we share in His nature, which is possible only if
He shares in ours.16 [c] Similarly, even apart from sin, the Church and the
eucharist would be skillful means for bringing us into union with Christ
and the Godhead.  Christ is the head of His Body.  But the head of a body
is “conformed to” (of the same nature as) its members, and is the source
that directs their movement and enlivens their senses.  It is in the
Incarnation that Christ becomes conformed to human beings, and becomes
the source of their charity, grace, and perfection.17 It is because Christ
assumed our nature that the eucharist can be “the sacrament of unity,”
where we share in His flesh and are naturally made one Body with Christ
and with one another.  And because Christ also shares the nature of Deity,
Christ is the Mediator of our union with the Trinity.  The completion of this
union is such a great good that surely the Church would not have lacked it,
had there been no human fall!18
[4] Finally, the Incarnation perfects both cosmos and microcosm with
respect to glory.  Christ’s union with flesh crowns the material universe
with consummate beauty.19 Moreover, glory will perfect the whole human
being—the body, the senses, the intellect.  Just as the Divine Word gives
the mind’s eye something to see, so the glorified assumed human nature
gives the bodily eye something to look at, so that the blessed human “pass-
es over” into God with both corporeal and spiritual parts.20 Thus, if bene-
fits for humankind are what rebut the Anselmian presumption against the
Incarnation created by the metaphysical “size-gap,” so also and all the
more so should such perfecting of humankind apart from sin!
Grosseteste’s “Incarnation anyway” discussion forwards the theme of
flesh in a remarkable way.  God made human being and glorified the
material world with consummate beauty, and allows the bodily eye to
enjoy a vision of God.  The “one flesh” marriage of Adam and Eve in the
Garden prophesies the “one flesh” union of Christ and His Church.21 The
eucharist occasions a fleshly union where our flesh takes in Christ’s, and
Christ incorporates us into His Body so that we are made members of one
another.22 Even in Paradise, the “one flesh union” sacraments of marriage
and eucharist would be celebrated (along with priestly ordination to fur-
nish ministers for the rites).23
Yet, such emphasis on flesh merely reasserts the idea that just as the
whole universe—and not only its spiritual part—goes out from God (exi-
tus) in creation, so the whole universe—and not only its spiritual part—
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should return to God (redditus), with human being—that metaphysical
spirit-matter straddler—leading the way.  On this picture, all things
would find their end in (and so would be made for the sake of) microcos-
mic humanity that unites spirit and flesh in unity of person.  All things
would find their ultimate end in Christ, God the Son, who joins Himself
with humanity in hypostatic union.  On this “Incarnation anyway”
hypothesis, the end of all material things would be the Church tri-
umphant, and pre-eminently Christ its head.  All creatures would strain
forward and “pant after” that consummate union, stretch toward the
God-man head of the Church, whose advent would be the end of all
things and the fullness of time!24
2.2. Varieties of Caution: Already in Cur Deus Homo, Anselm acknowl-
edges that while Divine Justice focuses on propriety, not all considerations
of fit are decisive; convenientia come in different weights.25 Where—in spec-
ulative theology—they underdetermine, it becomes methodologically
interesting to watch great thinkers decide what to say.
2.2.1. Reluctance to Determine, Curricular Quarrels: However inspir-
ing the picture of Christ’s cosmic and microcosmic significance apart from
sin, Grosseteste himself declines to embrace it.  He advances the arguments
as “apparently efficacious,”26 even “persuasive.”27 But at the end of the
day, he maintains a disciplined agnosticism:
“These and other arguments of this sort seem to show that God
would be human even if humans had never sinned.  But whether this
is true, I do not know, and I suffer not a little because of this igno-
rance.  For—as I said above—I don’t recall having seen any of our
authorities determine this question.  And without explicit authority, I
do not dare to assert anything about such a difficult question.  For an
argument probable to my small intelligence and knowledge can sure-
ly go astray.”28
Grosseteste’s hesitation is the more striking because—as James McEvoy
points out—most of the retailed arguments do take their inspiration from
recognized auctoritates—viz., from patristic exegesis of Holy Scripture.
Grosseteste himself was thoroughly familiar with well-established patterns
of patristic exegesis that represent the Incarnation as Divine Goodness
seeking to share itself as much as possible (Ephesians 2:4-10); as a supreme
proof of God’s love and friendship (John 3:16); as metaphysical mediation
between the Father and the world (Hebrews 1:2-3; Colossians 1:17; John
1:18, 16:6-18).  Likewise, patristic exegesis insisted on Christ’s role in cre-
ation (Gen 1:1; Proverbs 8:22; Ecclesiasticus 24:5 and Colossians 1:15),
understood humans to be created in Christ’s image (Genesis 1:26), took all
things to be created for Christ’s sake (Ephesians 1:3-14; Colossians 1:15-20),
and saw in the ante lapsum union of Adam and Eve a prophecy of the
Incarnation and of the union between Christ and the Church (Genesis 2:23-
24).  These interpretive traditions positively invited the conclusion—which
the fathers in question did not explicitly draw—that God would have
become Incarnate, even apart from human sin.29
Two studies by Stephen F. Brown30 suggest that Grosseteste’s reserve
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may find its wider context in a debate about the appropriate syllabus for
academic theology.  Traditionally, Holy Scripture was the ordinary text, lec-
tio the pedagogical method, line-by-line commentaries the professorial
product in theology courses.  Yet, from the beginning, lectio-focus on the let-
ter of the text shaded over into questions about its meaning, which spilled
over into an interest in probing more deeply into the theological issues
raised by the text.  The lectio method was supplemented by the quaestio,
which arrayed pro and contra arguments for contradictory answers, the bet-
ter to focus the issue, which then might be debated and determined by the
master in charge.  At first, quaestiones were raised and answered in connec-
tion with the lectures.  But Richard Fishacre notes how some modern mas-
ters were beginning to separate these tasks, so that they taught only morals
in the course of their lectures on Scripture and saved doctrinal questions for
their lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.31 The dispute was over what
the latter book and broad-sense philosophy (which encompassed the liberal
arts and philosophy proper) had to do with theology.  In the inaugural lec-
ture to his own Sentence-commentary, Fishacre attempted to chart a via
media. Holy Scripture is the subject-matter of theology, but thorough
grounding in the secular science helps to make clear the Bible’s contents.
Disputing the questions of Lombard’s Sentences does not take one away from
the study of Holy Scriptures, but is a way of faithfully expounding them.32
Expertise in philosophy broad-sense and narrow positively benefits the
faith, because it constitutes skill in raising questions and eliciting answers
implicitly contained (indistincte) in Holy Scripture.33 Accordingly, following
Alexander of Hales’ Parisian example—Fishacre was the first to make the
Sentences the ordinary text for theology at Oxford.34
As Bishop of Lincoln (whose jurisdiction then included Oxford),
Grosseteste took the other side in 1246, and tried to limit the ordinary the-
ology lectures to the books of the Old and New Testaments, although Pope
Innocent IV came to Fishacre’s defense.35 And this brings us back to the
Bishop’s surprising posture regarding the “Incarnation anyway” argu-
ments that he so forcefully presents.  Grosseteste disapproved of making
speculative doctrinal questions the subject-matter of theology.  Patristic
exegesis might contain the makings of answers, but—so far as Grosseteste
can remember—no auctoritates explicitly raise and determine this doctrinal
question.36 For him to put a new question and determine it, might have
seemed to him to send a misleading signal or to set a bad example.
2.2.2. Indecisive Arguments, Pious Pragmatics: Writing a generation or
so later, Bonaventure and Aquinas also evidence reluctance, this time not
eventually to determine the question, but to allow what they regard as
philosophical considerations to carry the day.  Uneven as the individual
“Incarnation anyway” arguments are, Bonaventure clearly feels the force
of their cumulative case.  Insofar as they appeal to considerations of excel-
lence and order, Bonaventure deems “Incarnation anyway” more in accor-
dance with “the judgment of reason.”  Bonaventure declares both positions
defensible, both encouraging of piety and devotion.37 Difficult as he finds
it to say which of these is the truer, Bonaventure ultimately decides the
question on pragmatic grounds of piety. Remedy for sin is the only reason
explicitly mentioned by the authorities (Scripture and the Saints).  It inflames the
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faithful more to think of the Incarnation as cleansing them from pollution
than abstractly to consider how it perfects the universe.  Likewise, the mys-
tery of the Incarnation is better commended by the dramatic—by empha-
sizing how something drastic would be required to placate God and
restore sin-wrought wreckage.38
Piety might also protest the very idea of Incarnation being required for
the natural perfection of creatures.  To speak of the Incarnation as perfect-
ing the created universe seems to subsume God under the rubric of per-
fecting God’s works.  Bonaventure finds it more respectful to see hypostat-
ic union as surplus goodness, over and above what may be required for the
natural completion of any created being; likewise more pious, to regard
God as transcending every created order.39 Even if the capacity for hypo-
static union contributes to the dignity of human nature, it does not have to
be actualized for humans to be the noblest of creatures.40
Here Aquinas agrees.  Actual hypostatic union does not pertain to the
natural potency or perfection of human or any other created substance
nature.  If it did, Aquinas thinks, we could reason from Divine consistency
of purpose that God would not create human beings without that potency’s
being actualized in someone (any more than, e.g., God would create all
human beings blind).  Rather the capacity for hypostatic union pertains to
the obediential potency of created substance natures, and it does not follow
from Divine Wisdom and Goodness and Power that God would actualize
all of the obediential potency that pertains to creatures, since it does not fol-
low that God would do everything Divine Power can do.41 Where the puta-
tive perfection is thus supranatural, we cannot know what the Divine will
would choose unless it is handed down to us in Sacred Scripture.  
Turning to the arguments from the microcosmic perfection of
humankind, Bonaventure insists that neither grace nor glory requires
Incarnation.  Apart from the fall, the human mind would not have been
darkened by sin, and would have been able to read the Book of Nature;
God’s power, wisdom, and liberality would have been so obvious in cre-
ation that there would have been no need for God to meet humans at the
level of their sensory attention in the Incarnation.42 Likewise, Bonaventure
contends, God could have put us in a position to earn merit by sending the
Holy Spirit into our hearts, without sending the Son of God into the flesh.43
De-emphasizing concern for the redditus of material creation, Bonaventure
finds it decidedly more pious to say that vision of the Divine nature would
be sufficient to beatify the whole, so that the glory of the superior parts
(e.g., intellect and will) would overflow into the lower (sensory and bodily)
parts, whether or not there was any Divine flesh to see!  Here, too, Aquinas
completely concurs.44
2.2.3. Silence as Denial: In his Sentence-commentary, Aquinas declares
both answers defensible, but neither demonstrable, and does not choose
between them.  Even though the negative verdict—that God would not
have become Incarnate anyway—is supported by explicit statements in
Augustine and Pope Leo’s tome that Scripture always links Incarnation to
the remedy for sin, Aquinas does not in this earlier work allow such auc-
toritates to trump opposing arguments that Incarnation exalts human
nature and constitutes the consummation of the whole created universe.45
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In the Summa Theologica, however, Aquinas determines the question in the
negative.  For whatever unstated reasons he now leaves aside patristic exe-
gesis of “cosmic Christ” passages to read Scripture as the above-mentioned
auctoritates from Augustine and Pope Leo do.  Thus, while Incarnation
does de facto confer supranatural dignity on the human race and thence on
the created universe, Aquinas concludes, it would be more fitting to deny
that God would have done it for that reason alone and apart from sin.46
Methodologically, Aquinas’ posture in the Summa Theologica is extreme.
For [a] we are not dealing with a case in which philosophical reflection
yields results that are contradictory to the evident claims of Scripture or
creeds.  Not only are the excellence of the universe and the remedy for sin
compatible desiderata; Aquinas agrees with all and sundry that they are
both goals to which the Incarnation de facto contributes.  [b] Nor is Aquinas
opposed to importing into theology the pseudo-Dionysian philosophical
conceptuality of Goodness as self-diffusing.  He himself uses it to defend
the metaphysical propriety of Incarnation.47 [c] Aquinas is not content to
signal the tentative nature of philosophical speculation towards theological
conclusions that go beyond what is explicit in the primary authoritative
documents.  In Cur Deus Homo, Anselm repeatedly cautions readers to be
open to alternative and better answers (e.g., regarding whether heaven
was originally intended for angels only, or how God took a sinless human
nature from Adam’s race),48 and—fides quaerens intellectum—repeatedly
offers reasoned explanations (e.g., not one but two rationales for the
immaculate conception of Jesus).49 [d] Rather, given that the issue depends
on God’s free and contingent choices, Aquinas takes the alleged fact that
the Bible does not explicitly mention other reasons to be equivalent to denying
that there are any other reasons ante-mortem thinkable by us that would be
sufficient for God.  And he does so, even where theologically acceptable
philosophical conceptualizations of Divine perfection suggest answers.
Aquinas concludes, we can all shout, “Felix culpa!” because God would not
have become Incarnate apart from Adam’s fall!50
2.2.4. The Spirit of Adventure: By contrast, Fishacre’s methodological
stance seems closer to Anselm’s.  Like Grosseteste but contrary to Aquinas
in the Summa Theologica, Fishacre does not find the Scriptures so silent
about Christ’s cosmic role, alluding as he does to a shorter list of proof-
texts (among which he instances Ephesians 1:9-11 and Galatians 4:14) that
seem positively (if less than explicitly) to link Incarnation with cosmic com-
pletion.51 Like Anselm but contrary to Grosseteste, Fishacre thinks that
making the implicit explicit is the theologian’s job.  
For his part, Fishacre explains away the frequency of the Bible’s pro-
motion of the Incarnation as the remedy for sin, by appeal to the very
rhetorical consideration Bonaventure identifies: viz., its power to enkin-
dle gratitude.  Fishacre’s grimly realistic estimate is that we are more
grateful for goods conferred on us alone (and hence for redemption spe-
cially conferred on humankind) than for those given to others as well
(say, the perfection of the universe as a whole).52 Nevertheless, the
Bible’s sometime comment on Christ’s cosmic role need not undermine
the spiritual director’s enterprise of stirring devotion.  For even if the
Incarnation benefits by perfecting the world as a whole, everybody
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agrees that the passion was for us sinners, and would not have been suf-
fered apart from Adam’s fall!53
2.2.5. What Kind of Perfection? Turning to the material issue of
whether or how Incarnation contributes to the excellence of the universe,
Scotus later advances a helpful distinction between passive and active
capacities.  Against Aquinas, Scotus argues that if beatific intimacy with
God is the human and angelic goal, such creatures must by nature have a
passive capacity to receive the mental quality or qualities that constitute
beatific vision of the Godhead.  Yet, no creature has the corresponding
active capacity to actualize that potentiality.  Rather God alone acts as a
free and supranatural efficient cause in producing that beatific vision.54
Similarly, “Incarnation anyway” advocates could have agreed against
Aquinas that the passive capacity for hypostatic union is natural to
(human) created substance natures, but that no created natural active
power can produce that result.  Rather created substance natures are (as
Aquinas also concedes) in obediential potency with respect to Divine
power, which can produce that effect.55 Thus, whether you count hypostat-
ic union as perfecting the nature (because of the natural passive capacity)
or supranatural perfection (because of the supranatural efficient cause), it
adds dignity to the nature—a dignity, they would insist, that self-diffusing
Goodness would not be less inclined to share in the absence of sin.
2.3. Well-Organized Love Affair: In the last decades of the thirteenth
century, John Duns Scotus approached Christology with the exuberant dic-
tum, inspired by devotion and diametrically opposed to Aquinas’ policy in
Summa Theologica: viz., where matters are underdetermined by Scripture
and authoritative ecclesiastical documents, be bold, exhibit Godlike extrav-
agance; risk praising Christ too much rather than too little; praise Christ as
much as you can!  In this vein, Scotus firmly “seconds” the overall conclu-
sion of earlier “Incarnation anyway” arguments: viz., that it would be max-
imally irrational to regard sin as a sine qua non of Incarnation.  For God is a
maximally well-organized Lover, and it would be incongruous for the best
thing God does in creation to be driven by the worst thing creatures do!56
Scotus recognizes natural or explanatory priorities and posteriorities with-
in a single instant of time or within the “now” of eternity.  He marks these
by speaking of earlier and later “signs” or “instants of nature.”  The order
of explanation is the order of Divine purposes.  On Scotus’ distinctive
analysis, God does not first (in an earlier instant of nature) aim at the per-
fection of the universe and then (in a subsequent instant of nature) recog-
nize Incarnation as a constitutive means thereto.  Rather God’s principal
aim in creation (in the first instant of nature) is to widen the circle of trini-
tarian friendship love by welcoming spiritual creatures into it; first and
foremost, Divine love elects to include the soul of Christ.  To fit that soul
for such exalted society, God wills (in the second instant of nature) not
only to infuse it with fullness of grace and virtue, maximal knowledge, and
impeccability of will; God also wills for it to be hypostatically united to the
Divine Word.57 Only afterwards (in a still later instant of nature) does God
will to create a material world, so that the soul of Christ (an incomplete
being) and other co-lovers may enjoy natural fitness as the substantial
forms of a complete individual human natures.59  Thus, spiritual crea-
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tures, pre-eminently the soul of Christ, are made for God’s sake; and the
God-man does not exist to complete the world; rather the material world is
made for Christ’s sake.  Scotus’ God is focussed on glory; all of this is set-
tled prior in the order of explanation to Divine permission of and
fore/middle knowledge of sin.  Once sin comes into the picture, Christ vol-
unteers for the “secondary” mission of making satisfaction for the sin of
Adam’s race.59
2.4. Reasons and Priorities: Taking stock, we see [1] how Anselm,
Bonaventure, Aquinas (in the Summa Theologica) all agree that remedy for sin
is a sine qua non of Incarnation.  For them, restoration collapses the two pro-
jects of reversing the damaging effects of sin and lifting us up beyond our
natural capacities into a graced society involving union with God.  But—
pace Anselm—neither Bonaventure nor Aquinas treats Incarnation as a sine
qua non condition of the remedy for sin.  Rather Incarnation figures in the
best—because most integrative—approach that God could adopt.  
[2] Anselm, the theologians whose arguments Grosseteste retails,
Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus all promote beatific love and intimacy
with God the Blessed Trinity as the optimal human condition.  Getting
human sinners there is the Divine purpose upon which—Anselm thinks—
the Incarnation is conditionally necessary.  But even Grosseteste’s
“Incarnation-anyway” authors, Fishacre, and Scotus have to admit that
beatific love and vision are possible for human souls not hypostatically
united to a Divine person (e.g., beatific vision and love are possible for all
Christians).  So—apart from sin—the spiritual exitus/redditus could be
achieved without Incarnation by the infusion of graces, spiritual gifts, etc.
and by other exercizes of Divine power to cause the vision and confirm the
will in love.  For Scotus, hypostatic union is the measure of the extrava-
gance of Divine love that seeks the maximum possible union with its
favorite object, the soul of Christ!  What is striking about the earlier argu-
ments listed by Grosseteste is how they manage to give material redditus
equal weight.  While Bonaventure and Aquinas both sound the theme that
Incarnation into metaphysically straddling human being unites God with
the whole of creation, their account of human beatification reflects a more
subordinate interest in our material dimensions.  This tendency is all the
more explicit in Scotus, who makes God’s creation of the material world
very much an afterthought (i.e., a very remote means), undertaken so that
Christ’s human soul is not left dangling as a metaphysically incomplete
being!
[3] Bonaventure and Aquinas insist that Incarnation is not a sine qua non
condition of the natural perfection of the universe; God will not have left
creation defective, naturally incomplete if God does not hypostatically unite
Godself to some part of it.  He simply will have refrained from adorning it by
actualizing its highest supranatural capacity.  Since—most school theolo-
gians agree—it is empirically obvious that God does not adorn creatures as
much as God could (witness how many individual creatures could have
better accidents than they do), one can’t credibly insist that God every-
where and always maximizes along this parameter.
[4] Nevertheless, when Grosseteste’s “Incarnation anyway” authors,
Fishacre, and Scotus deny that sin is a sine qua non of Incarnation, they do
so, because they think that God could find other good enough
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(Grosseteste’s “Incarnation-anyway” authors and Fishacre) or even better
(Scotus) reasons on which to act in hypostatically uniting a particular
human nature to the Divine Word.  Among middle-third-of-the-thirteenth
century authors, Fishacre refuses to decide which of God’s actual rea-
sons—remedy for sin and perfection of the universe—is primary.
Apparently, each and either would be good enough by itself for God to act
upon.  Scotus does say that Divine desire to include the soul of Christ with-
in the trinitarian friendship circle is God’s de facto reason for Incarnation.
But—given his high doctrine of Divine freedom—Scotus would presum-
ably grant the metaphysical possibility of God’s freely willing to become
Incarnate for any number of other reasons.  What Scotus insists upon is
that the efficacious Divine resolve to hypostatically unite itself to the soul
of Christ, is prior in the order of explanation to any Divine consideration of
sin or its remedy.  For Scotus, it is doubly contingent that Incarnation fig-
ures in the remedy for sin at all, insofar as [a] sin is contingent and [b] what
counts as satisfaction-making and whether any satisfaction is needed, are a
function of Divine free choice (God could have waived satisfaction or
accepted the created sinner’s repentance, for example).  Thus, when it
comes to Incarnation, Anselm’s God is focussed on the repair of sin; the
God of Grosseteste’s “Incarnation-anyway” authors and of Fishacre may
have binocular vision; while Scotus’ God fixes His attention first and fore-
most on glory, human as well as Divine!
III. Cur Deus Homo? The Problem, Reconfigured
We think with the past to profit in the present, to make it our own
before we hand it down.  Methodologically, this need not mean that we—
like icon-painters of legend—merely copy the copies precisely, projecting
into them as little of ourselves as we can.  In the middle ages, it would
entail holding Scripture, creeds, and ecumenical councils constant, while
questioning and disputing past auctoritates, to see how themes and theses
reconfigure when set up against new premisses.  As a contemporary
Christian philosopher, long-since medieval, I turn now to set my own
answers to cur Deus homo? up against those of my “out-classing” predeces-
sors, to assess how considerations of perfection and repair, attention to cos-
mic and human loci reintegrate and recombine.61
3.1. Alternatives, Priorities, and False Choices: Still another way to
frame what is at stake in our disputed question—whether God would have
become Incarnate, even if humans had never sinned?—is whether God’s
decision to become Incarnate issues out of Divine purposes for creation, or,
or as well as, the human need for redemption. Middle-third-of-the-thir-
teenth century “Incarnation anyway” authors answer “both/and”:  God’s
creative aim at universal excellence would have been enough, and the
human need for redemption would have been enough.  Scotus replies,
“First and foremost, God’s goals in creation.”  On Scotus’ scheme, human
need for redemption does not function as a reason for Incarnation.  Rather,
only because the Incarnation is already in place (at the earlier instant of
nature) does it seem wise and efficient (at the later instant of nature) for the
Incarnate One to supply the remedy for sin. 
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Yet, these stances are open to them, only because they conceive of sin as
optional—i.e., because they think it metaphysically possible for humans
and angels to exist without ever sinning.  This is how middle-third-of-the-
thirteenth-century “Incarnation anyway” authors can regard “if humans
never sinned” as something other than contrary to necessary fact.  Scotus is
able to place Incarnation prior in the order of explanation to sin and its
need of remedy, only because he makes the same assumption.  If sin were
a naturally necessary consequence of the existence of rational creatures the
way revolutions around the earth were supposed to be of the existence of
earth and sun, then Divine decision to create the soul of Christ and other
rational creatures in a world such as this would already include in it the
inevitability of sin and its need of remedy.  And the question, “Cur Deus
homo? Creation? or Redemption?” would represent a false choice.  
My own approach is not “creation” exclusive-or “redemption,” but
“both/and.”  Refusing to choose, I would see Divine reasons cur Deus homo
as at least triple: the Creator’s drive towards cosmic perfection (sponsored
by middle-third-of-the-thirteenth-century “Incarnation anyway” authors),
Divine Love’s determination to unite with Its created object (featured by
Scotus), and the repair of the non-optimal human condition and non-opti-
mal Divine-human relations.  Because—unlike medieval (but not all patris-
tic) theologians—I see human non-optimality as inevitable given God’s
creative aims, I do not envision a situation in which God’s creative and
redemptive motives for Incarnation would break apart.
3.2. Divine Love for Material Creation: Like Scotus, I begin by accentu-
ating the positive, by contending that Incarnation is part and parcel of
God’s creative aims.  Whereas Scotus sees God approaching the project
with an initial focus on love among spiritual beings (the Divine persons,
the soul of Christ, other human souls and angels), and brings the material
world in as an afterthought (at a much later instant of nature); my hypoth-
esis begins with Divine love of material creation—not just any material cre-
ation, but a world including matter such as this—which leads to
Incarnation two ways. 
3.2.1. Perfecting the Cosmos: On the one hand, Divine love for material
creation such as this includes a Divine desire to perfect it by making matter
as Godlike as possible while allowing it to have its own integrity.  So God
creates physico-chemical processes, with energy and dynamic power to inter-
act, produce new things within a framework of order and stability.
Beyond that, God wants creation to live. And so God makes plants and
animals with a capacity for self-replication and self-sustenance.  Moreover,
God adds perception, so that life can have, and interact with the world from
its own point of view.  Finally, God endows animal nature with personality,
with self-consciousness, the capacity for relationship, the ability to give and receive
love.  Thus, human nature crowns God’s efforts to make material cre-
ation—while yet material—more and more Godlike.  What finishing touch
could be added to this perfecting process other than for God to actualize
the potency of material creation for hypostatic union, in which there is
unity of person while the natures remain unconfused?
3.2.2. Lovers United:  On the other hand, love seeks union with its object
(in this case, God with material creation).  Certainly, God and creatures are
152 Faith and Philosophy
inevitably united by a real relation of dependence of the creature on God.
Divine love goes further, when It seeks to enter into personal intimacy with
material creation, by attempting to win the heart of each and every human
being.  Divine desire to unite heaven to earth and earth to heaven, Godhead
to material creation, finds its culmination in the Incarnation, when God
becomes part of it, when a Divine person unites a human nature to Itself.  
Thus, on this account as much as Scotus’, Divine desire to have a cre-
ation to love, leads to a cosmic exitus, which involves not only the “going
out” from God of created beings, but also God’s “going out” to unite
Godself to material creation.  
3.3. Redemption from Horrors: Redemption represents repair work,
and constitutes a negative motive for Incarnation.  But if medieval theolo-
gians generally conceptualize the non-optimal human condition and non-
optimal Divine-human relations in terms of sin and its consequences, I
begin with the problem of horrendous evils and refocus non-optimality
problems by subsuming them under the rubric of “participation in hor-
rors.”  I define horrors as evils the participation in (the doing or suffering
of which) constitutes prima facie reason to believe that the participant’s life
cannot be a great good to him/her on the whole.  Intuitively, horrors
include the very worst that we can suffer, be, or do.  Where value wholes
are concerned, I borrow Roderick Chisholm’s distinction between “balanc-
ing-off” (an additive relation in which the value or disvalue of one part is
merely summed with that of the others) and “defeat” (in which the value
or disvalue of one part is brought into a relation of organic unity with oth-
ers in the whole).  On my understanding, horrors so devour the goodness
of our lives that we cannot conceive of any package of merely created
goods that would balance them off.  They so eat into and pervert our
meaning-making structures as to degrade us by prima facie defeating the
positive significance of our lives, leaving us and onlookers at a loss to see
how it could be worthwhile for us to go on.  My own measure is that hor-
rors are so bad that the only way to restore the possibility of positive meaning for
the participant is to integrate participation in them into that person’s relationship
with God, where God is the Incommensurate Good, and where a personal relation-
ship with God, which is beatific on the whole and in the end, is understood to be
incommensurately good-for the created person.
I find it empirically obvious that humans are radically vulnerable to par-
ticipation in horrors.  And I trace this vulnerability back, not in the first
instance to anything we do or that our primal ancestors have done, but to
what and where we are—to our natures as enspirited matter, as personal
animals, placed in a material environment such as this under conditions of
real and apparent scarcity.  Ultimately, our predicament is an inevitable
consequence of God’s creative purpose, of Divine love which makes a
material world such as this, allows it to evolve into ever more Godlike
forms, eventually into personal animals, and still—for the most part—per-
mits material creatures to be themselves, “to do their own thing.” 
My contention is that a God Who loved material creation would want to
compensate the material creatures who bear the greatest cost for the Divine
creative experiment, to honor personal animality by restoring the possibility
of positive meaning, by defeating participation in horrors within the frame-
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work of the individual participants’ lives.  A logical step in this direction, one
that otherwise accords with the thrust of God’s creative intentions, would be
for God to identify with human radical vulnerability to horrors, through the
Incarnation and passion of Christ.  Thus, God’s exitus into creation to become
part of it, is also decisive for the redditus, for the manifold reunion of material
creation with its Creator, first and foremost through those material creatures
who are most Godlike, through the individual human nature Christ
assumes, and through us horror-ridden human beings.  
3.4. “God-Infested” Creation: Bonaventure worried that making
Incarnation a contribution to the natural perfection of the universe might
be insulting to God, somehow spiritually dangerous in tempting us to treat
God as “a means only” and not as “an end in” Godself.  In my judgment,
this concern is metaphysically misguided.  Certainly, it is not one that
either Bonaventure or Aquinas is in a position consistently to press.
Roughly speaking, there are two understandings of created natures in
school theology.  One (espoused by Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Henry of
Ghent) sees them as defined by imitability relations, as—at their metaphys-
ical foundations—ways of imitating the Divine essence.  The other
(defended by later Aristotelians such as Scotus and Ockham) insists that
natures are fundamentally integrated congeries of powers, whose constitu-
tion is metaphysically necessary and prior in the order of explanation to
their relations to anything else.  Turning to rational creatures in particular,
there are roughly two approaches to their natural functioning.  The later
Aristotelians (such as Scotus and Ockham) think that the built in nature-
constituting powers and the capacities that necessarily flow from them, are
sufficient for the always-or-for-the-most-part smooth functioning of things.
By contrast, those influenced by Augustine (which include Bonaventure
and Henry of Ghent), think that Divine power not only endows the crea-
ture with the powers in the first place and sustains it in existence, but also
that Divine illumination is involved in the day-to-day smooth functioning
of human thinking and willing.  Christ the Teacher reveals Eternal Truth
about which we reason, the normative standards that govern our will.
Bonaventure takes this for granted in the Itinerarium, when he wonders
why—with God ever at work in the inner human, whenever we think and
will—more people are not aware of this!
In my judgment, the idea that creation needs, at every level, to be God-
infested—God as the paradigm that defines their essence, God as the furnish-
er and sustainer of being, God as a partner in natural functioning—humbles
creation by emphasizing its dependence, and magnifies God as the source of
all.  For somewhat different philosophical reasons, I too insist that Divine
partnership is necessary for optimal human functioning.  At a high level of
generality, human radical vulnerability to and actual participation in horrors
furnishes ample evidence that it is beyond our merely human powers to
coordinate the “odd couple” of matter and spirit into a reliably smooth-func-
tioning unit in an environment such as this.  Actual participation in horrors
so stumps, indeed often wrecks the participants’ meaning-making capacities
as to require a “live-in” Teacher to work with us at both unconscious and
conscious levels to make eventual positive sense of our lives.  In my judgment
(although this is a longer story), the emergency exposes what St. Paul main-
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tained was the normal case: the Spirit of God always indwelling and helping,
groaning within us with sighs too deep for words.
3.5. Methodological Retrospective: As for how fides quaerens intellectum
should govern itself when probing Divine motivations for redemptive
choices, we can learn from all my authors if we distinguish between the
role of ecclesiastical authority in dogmatizing—i.e., defining doctrines as
binding on believers—and that of Christian philosophers and philosophi-
cal theologians in offering explanations.  Conciliar definitions are usually
demanded by particular polemical contexts.  They focus on what they take
to be certain and important, and are appropriately minimalist in scope.
Since the Truth is one, however, both fides quaerens intellectum and unbe-
lieving objectors may wonder how and whether the dogma can fit with
what else we believe to be true.  It belongs to Christian philosophy and
philosophical theology to shoulder the burden of this explanatory task.
Because philosophical claims are inherently controversial, we should
expect a variety of explanations of the same doctrinal claim.  Thus,
medieval school theology proved the ripe time for the Chalcedonian defin-
ition—that in Christ there are two distinct and unconfused natures and one
person—to receive extensive technical philosophical attention.  Among
others, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham brought their own dis-
tinctive philosophical commitments to bear.  None of them thought the
Church had any business dogmatizing the philosophically contentious
items that divided them.  At the same time, those many rigorous theoreti-
cal developments of the doctrine furnished gravitas and texture, and (to
those on the outside) exhibited the dogma as philosophically defensible.  
When we are pronouncing upon what “orthodoxy” requires of Christians
philosophers, I think it good to go some way with Aquinas’ Summa Theologica
reticence: to treat dogmatic silence about an item as equivalent to a denial that
the item is required.  (For example, since no ecumenical council has officially
defined the “penal substitutionary theory of the atonement,” we should
admit that it is not incumbant on any and all “orthodox” Christians to believe
it.)  But when it comes to philosophical and theological explanations, I take
my stand with Anselm.  Biblical and conciliar silence should not be enough to
stifle inquiry.  To be sure, it is good, indeed courteous, and evidence of a love
for Truth, for Christian philosophers and philosophical theologians to imitate
Anselm in Cur Deus Homo in identifying what is more and less speculative,
and distinguishing what is tentative from what is bedrock and entrenched.
Theological hypotheses should meet the test of congruence with Scripture
and conciliar definitions.  But where auctoritates underdetermine the matter,
let faith deepen understanding by speculating with Anselm and exploring
with Scotus.  The medieval moral I draw for contemporary Christian philoso-
phers is thus unsurprising: as Christian philosophers, let us praise Christ for
all we’re worth—as perfecter of the universe, first and head among co-lovers
of the Trinity, Savior of sinners, the Recreator of horror-shattered lives; and as
Christian philosophers, let inquiry be free, quaestio et disputatio unfettered, the
better in the end to commend our Christology for its consistency and coher-
ence, its fruitfulness and explanatory power!
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